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THE SMALL PROSPECTS FOR SHRINKING
THE BIG ANTITRUST CASE BY
PROCEDURAL REFORM
by Maxwell M. Blecher* & Consuelo S. Woodhead**
I. INTRODUCTION: THE BIG CASE PROBLEM
The "big case" is the bane of antitrust law. It is a source of constant
carping by the lawyers and judges involved and the object of constant
criticism by observers. It is not difficult to understand why. The specta-
cle of a single judge or jury attempting to assimilate months or even years
of complicated economic testimony strains credulity that even a mod-
icum of truth or justice can emerge from the litigation system.1 Similarly,
the spectacle of fifty or more lawyers crowding into a courtroom, filling
the jury and spectator seats, is one that is not at all unusual in antitrust
litigation, and it further strains credulity that the adversary process can
deal effectively with the case they have come to present.2
The big antitrust case is not a new phenomenon.3 Nor is concern over
the court's ability to deal effectively with such litigation. Fourteen years
ago in United States v. Grinnell Corp. ,a Judge Wyzanski observed:
[I]n recent years antitrust litigation, particularly Government civil
actions alleging violations of § 2 of the Sherman Act, have involved
*Member, California Bar.
**Member, New York and California Bars. Mr. Blecher and Ms. Woodhead are with
the firm of Blecher, Collins & Hoecker, Los Angeles, California.
1. One major monopolization case, United States v. International Business Machs.
Corp., No. 69-200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17, 1969), was in its third year of trial before the
Government's case in chief was completed.
2. For example, the complaint in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d
416 (2d Cir. 1945), named 63 defendants. Former Judge Rifkind has stated that he was one
of 84 lawyers in United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Cas. 69,619 (N.D.
Okla. 1960). Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, National Conference on
the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 96,
108 n. 13 (1976). The service list in In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 415 F. Supp.
384 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976) (M.D.L. No. 250) (order of transfer), lists 69 counsel for plaintiffs
and 49 for defendants; that in In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1018
(J.P.M.D.L. 1977) (M.D.L. Nos. 201, 201A) (order of transfer), lists 89 counsel for
plaintiffs and 54 for defendants.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
4. 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
an enormous, nearly cancerous, growth of exhibits, depositions, and
ore tenus testimony. Few judges who have sat in such cases have
attempted to digest the plethora of evidence, or indeed could do so
and at the same time do justice to other litigation in their courts. Nor
is there any sound reason to believe that such extensive presentation
accomplishes any important legal or other social end.
5
At the time he made this statement, Judge Wyzanski seemed to
contemplate a coming day when the "cancerous growth" would be
halted, even in monopolization cases, partly through judicial exhortation
but principally through clarification of governing legal standards and
consequent elimination of uncertainty as to the "boundaries of relevance
and materiality." 6 However, the big case has instead become an increas-
ingly common phenomenon which has prompted concern over the effica-
cy of the litigation process. At one time, the big antitrust case was almost
exclusively the domain of the government. In recent years, private
plaintiffs have entered the battlefield with increasing frequency. Not only
is there more private litigation,7 there is more private litigation of mam-
moth proportions.' Private plaintiffs, often major corporations which
once eschewed vindicating intra-industry grievances through antitrust
litigation, have broughtmonopolization cases and attempt to monopolize
cases either simultaneously with the government9 or alone. 10 Private
parties have also brought large national or regional price fixing cases in
5. Id. at 247.
6. Id.
7. The number of private damage claims filed nearly trebled, increasing from 446 in
1964 to 1230 in 1974. Handler, Antitrust-Myth and Reality in an Inflationary Era, 50
N.Y.U.L. REv. 211, 235 (1975).
8. See The Private Action-The Corporate Manager's Heavy Artillery, 43 ANTITRUST
L.J. 5 (1973).
9. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas.
161,853 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (order dismissing part of complaint and denying motion for order
dismissing counterclaims); Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 76-2512
(S.D.N.Y., filed June 7, 1976); Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 559 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 782 (1978); Telex Corp.
v. International Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
802 (1975); Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 839
(D. Minn. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Data Processing Fin. & Gen. Corp. v. International
Business Machs. Corp., 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970).
10. International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 527 F.2d 1162 (4th
Cir. 1975); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 507 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1974); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., [1978] 849 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-13 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 21, 1978) (judgment of liability); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., [1973] 612
ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-3 (S.D.'N.Y., filed Apr. 30, 1973); Bell & Howell
Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., [1973] 595 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) A-4 (N.D.
Ill., filed Jan. 4, 1973).
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advance of or in the absence of suits by the federal government, it as well
as concurrently with government suits.
12
These quantitative and qualitative changes in private antitrust litigation
have been met with correlative increases in the pitch of concern over the
judicial mode of resolving such disputes. The depth of current judicial
concern over the capacity of courts to deal with the big case is well
illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision last year in Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois. Under the "direct purchaser" rule of Illinois Brick, one
who has not dealt directly with the perpetrator of an antitrust violation
cannot as a rule recover for injuries or losses actually sustained as a
proximate result of the antitrust violation. At the same time, one who has
dealt directly with the wrongdoer can, with only narrow exceptions,
recover for his own use the full amount of an illegal overcharge, even
though he has in fact passed on most or all of it and thus has himself
sustained little or no real loss. Indeed, the Supreme Court candidly
admitted in Illinois Brick that it was "elevating direct purchasers to a
preferred position as private attorneys general" and thereby adopting a
rule which "denies recovery to those indirect purchasers who may have
been actually injured by antitrust violations."' 4
This is very radical surgery on a statute which expressly provides a
cause of action for damage to "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws."' 5 Actual injury, not privity, would seem to be the mandated
standard.
The essential justification for the direct purchaser rule of Illinois Brick
is not that it is compelled by any notion of proximate causation or the
like, but simply that it is expedient:
16
I1. E.g., In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 1977-2 Trade Cas. 61,639 (C.D.
Cal. 1977) (denial of motion to dismiss complaint); In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases,
487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Gypsum Wallboard,
340 F. Supp. 990 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972) (M.D.L. No. 14) (denial of motion for order of
remand).
12. E.g., In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 427 F. Supp. 1018 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977)
(M.D.L. Nos. 201, 201A) (order of transfer); In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation, 415
F. Supp. 384 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976) (M.D.L. No. 250) (order of transfer); In re Master Key
Antitrust Litigation, 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,456 (D. Conn. 1977) (pretrial ruling of liability
as a matter of law); In re Arizona Dairy Prods. Litigation, 1976-2 Trade Cas. 61,177 (D.
Ariz. 1976) (discovery order).
13. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
14. Id. at 746.
15. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
16. 431 U.S. at 732, 745. The Court also reasoned that its decision was compelled by
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), which had severely
limited the defensive use of a passing-on doctrine, and that adherence to Hanover Shoe
1978]
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Permitting the use of pass-on theories under § 4 essentially would
transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to apportion
the recovery among all potential plaintiffs that could have absorbed
part of the overcharge-from direct purchasers to middlemen to
ultimate consumers. However appealing this attempt to allocate the
overcharge might seem in theory, it would add whole new dimen-
sions of complexity to treble-damages suits and seriously undermine
their effectiveness.'
7
The message is clear: antitrust cases are already so troublesomely
complex that the courts cannot be bothered with the task of apportioning
damages among the many persons "who shall be injured" in their
business or property.
The depth of concern in the executive and legislative branches is
equally great. The present attorney general has suggested that monopoli-
zation cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act are so massive and so
complex that it might be more appropriate to "try" them before
Congress rather than individual judges. 18 More recently, President Carter
signed an executive order creating a special commission on antitrust
reform. 19 The problems posed by the big case are one of the two major
subjects the commission is to examine.20 It will study the possibilities for
shrinking the big case by reform of discovery procedures, assignment of
cases to judges with antitrust experience, expansion of judicial authority
to penalize dilatory tactics, simplification of the standards of proof in
structure cases under section 2 of the Sherman Act and nonjudicial
alternatives for the resolution of antitrust disputes.
In the private sector, the Litigation Section of the American Bar
Association has already undertaken a study of discovery abuse and
published a report recommending a number of reforms to the Federal'
Rules of Civil Procedure to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.21 These
recommendations range from a proposal to narrow the scope of discovery
from "the subject matter involved in the pending action" to "issues
was, in turn, compelled by considerations of stare decisis. 431 U.S. at 736. However, only
two weeks later in its next antitrust decision, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), the Court cast aside all consideration of stare decisis and went
out of its way to overrule a prior decision, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365 (1967).
17. 431 U.S. at 737.
18. Address by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, Spring Meeting of the Antitrust
Section of the American Bar Association (Apr. 14, 1977).
19. Exec. Order No. 12022, 42 Fed. Reg. 61,441 (1977).
20. The other is antitrust immunities. Id.
21. See A.B.A. LTIGATION NEWS, Jan. 1978, at 1 (summary of study).
[Vol. 11
PROCEDURAL REFORM
raised by the claims or defenses," 22 to limitations on the number of
interrogatories which may be propounded without leave of court23 to
dispensing with the filing of discovery papers until it is needed for a
motion or hearing.24 The ABA proposals are not limited to large or
complex antitrust cases, but there can be little doubt that the overwhelm-
ing discovery mires in such cases are a major concern underlying the
push for reform.
Two dangers inhere in focusing so much attention on the big case
problem-overreaction and overexpectation. Illinois Brick's dramatic
curtailment of retailer and consumer actions may be a case of overreac-
tion to the particularly acute problems posed by massive class action
litigation. 25 Certainly it has provoked quite a debate whether the direct
purchaser rule will enhance or actually detract from the ultimate pros-
pects for vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust laws. 26 The vari-
ous other, more modest proposals appear to pin great expectations on
shrinking the big antitrust case to manageable size through procedural
reforms or moderate substantive changes. There seems to be a wide-
spread feeling that good procedures make good law. Unfortunately, it is
not at all clear that formal procedural reforms-short of reforms which
emasculate antitrust enforcement-can significantly reduce the size,
complexity or length of most antitrust cases. On the theory that if one
comprehends the cause of the illness, he can better judge the proposed
prescription, it is useful to examine the reasons that antitrust cases are so
frequently big and unwieldy.
11. THE SUBSTANTIVE SOURCE OF SIZE
Some of the reasons why antitrust cases are so often large are self-
evident and need not be discussed at any length. Most antitrust cases are,
relatively speaking, big money cases, and in addition many are multipar-
ty suits. The high-stakes character of antitrust litigation in itself tends to
generate complexity. With hundreds of thousands-or today, even hun-
dreds of millions-of dollars at stake, the plaintiff's lawyer does not
want to leave any stone unturned if there is any hope of finding even a
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7.
25. Class actions present a number of sui generis problems of size, particularly as they
affect representation, notice, and manageability. These unique problems require separate
examination and are beyond the scope of this article, but observations and suggestions
made herein are applicable to class actions as well as to individual litigation.
26. See A Bill to Restore Effective Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws: Hearings on
H.R. 8359 Before the House Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977).
1978]
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scrap of evidence under it. By the same token, the defense lawyer feels
he cannot afford to bypass any possible means of extricating his client, or
at least delaying the day of reckoning. As a result, overreaching dis-
covery requests, tangential depositions, and dubious motions proliferate.
The road to trial naturally and almost inevitably tends to become a
marathon obstacle course.
But the single most important reason that so many antitrust cases are
massive at both the discovery and trial stages of litigation is that they are
complex issue cases. The root cause that these cases are big and the
reason that neither lawyers nor judges can well confine the scope of
inquiry, either during discovery or at trial, lie in the substantive rules
which control disposition.
At present, aside from the per se categories of cases under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 27 there are very few simplistic formulas in antitrust.
True, some of the formulations of the basic elements of an antitrust claim
sound simple, but when the question comes down to the nature and
quantum of evidence needed to meet these requirements, it is not at all
simple. For example, it is easy enough to state that the offense of
monopolization consists of "(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power." ' 28 But there is no precise guideline stating how much power is
monopoly power,2 9 and the definition of relevant product and geographic
markets or submarkets, particularly the former, requires consideration of
such a variety of factors3' that inquiry into every facet of the industry
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
28. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
29. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948) ("We do not
undertake to prescribe any set of percentage figures .... "). Compare, e.g., Cliff Food
Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 207 n.2 (5th Cir. 1969)(something more than
50% is prerequisite) and United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d
Cir. 1945)(90% of supply is enough to constitute a monopoly; doubtful whether 60-64% is
enough; 33% certainly is not enough) with Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp.,
537 F.2d 1347, 1366-68 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977) (less than 20%
clearly not enough; but no rigid rule requiring a 50% minimum without regard to other
factors) and with Pacific Coast Agriculture Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526
F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976) (market share ranging
from 45% to 70% is enough when qualitative aspects of role in marketplace provide other
evidence of monopoly power).
30. The basic definition as expressed in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956), is that a relevant product market "is composed of products
that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced-
price, use and qualities considered." However, there may be recognizable "submarkets
that are separate economic entities." United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 572
(1966). Determination of a relevant submarket involves consideration and balancing of
numerous indicia, including "industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate
[Vol. I1I
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involved and assimilation of abstruse economic testimony is absolutely
essential. Indeed, the need to prove a relevant market is probably the
most salient example of a substantive antitrust rule which not merely
invites but requires massive discovery via document requests, inter-
rogatories, third party subpoenas, depositions, and expert evaluation.
And the need to prove a relevant market arises in merger or acquisition
cases under section 731 of the Clayton Act (or section 1 of the Sherman
Act),32 in rule of reason cases under section 1 of the Sherman Act,33 in
monopolization cases under section 231 of the Sherman Act 35 and, in most
circuits, in attempt and conspiracy to monopolize cases under section 2
of the Sherman Act. 36 Cases involving tying or exclusive dealing ar-
rangements under section 3 of the Clayton Act 37 or section 1 of the
Sherman Act also require some analysis of the market and competitive
milieu in which the alleged violation occurs. 38 In short, only cases
involving the limited categories of per se claims under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, various price discrimination cases, or the unlikely cases in
which the parties agree on market definition and relevant statistics are
very susceptible of narrow discovery and short trials. For the remainder,
the substantive law imposes its own discovery and trial burdens.
Moreover, the substantive law of antitrust, viewed over time, is akin to
constitutional or Biblical exegesis. From the "comprehensive charter of
economic liberty" 39 embodied in the Sherman Act, there has grown a
economic entity, the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production
facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized
vendors." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,325 (1962) (footnote omitted).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
32. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
33. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
36. See, e.g., Forbro Design Corp. v. Raytheon Co., 532 F.2d 758 (1st Cir. 1976); FLM
Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1097 (1977); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1975);
McElhenney Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332 (4th Cir. 1959); Yoder Bros.
v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1094 (1977); Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Mullis v. Arco Petroleum Corp., 502 F.2d 290 (7th Cir.
1974); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1122 (1977); Pacific Eng. & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977); Merit Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 417 F. Supp. 263
(D.D.C. 1976). But see Oetiker v. Jurid Werke, G. m. b. H., 556 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1977).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
38. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (Clayton Act § 3);
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610-11, 615 (1953) (Sher-
man Act § 1).
39. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
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significant body of decisional interpretation which is still growing. As
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, discussed above, illustrates, the growth
does not consist merely of refinements; it includes sharp changes in
direction. The state of the law at any one moment may be unclear or it
may change during the course of litigation. Such uncertainty in itself
tends to spawn lengthy discovery and trials because neither the parties
nor the courts can easily locate the outer limits of relevance or materiality
of evidentiary data.'
Even more importantly, the exegesis of antitrust principles seems to be
tending toward increasing complexity. As the economic environment in
which antitrust law operates likewise tends toward increasing complexi-
ty, the two work in tandem to make antitrust cases even more unwieldy
than they have been in the past. Recent judicial attempts to delineate
simple formulas have regularly been subjected to subsequent complica-
tion, qualification, negation or just plain confusion. The history of
vertical non-price restraints over the past fifteen years is one notable
example. When it first considered the legality of vertically imposed
customer and territorial resale restrictions apart from vertical price fix-
ing, the Supreme Court adopted a rule of reason approach, stating that it
knew "too little" of the motivations behind and actual impact of such
arrangements to classify them as per se violations. a" This approach, of
course, required detailed evidence of the specific effects on competition
of the particular arrangement in question. 42 Four years later in United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. ,43 the Court, though asserting that it
had undertaken a rule of reason analysis, seemed to herald basically a per
se approach to vertical non-price restraints, an approach which obviously
simplifies the analysis and thus the litigation required for disposition. The
40. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 247 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd in
part, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
41. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261-64 (1963).
42. The classic formulation of the rule of reason is reiterated in Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the
reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained,
are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an otherwise
objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of the intent may help
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
433 U.S. at 49-50 n. 15 (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1918)).
43. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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Court stated that "[u]nder the Sherman Act it is unreasonable without
more for a manufacturer to seek to restrict and confine areas or persons
with whom an article may be traded after the manufacturer has parted
with dominion over it.''44 But Schwinn left room for loopholing and,
faced with an almost infinite variety of vertical commercial arrangements
and asserted reasons for undertaking them, that is just what many courts
did. There developed exceptions from the per se approach for territorial
restrictions framed as location clauses45 or primary responsibility
clauses, 46 restrictions which are not firmly and resolutely enforced, 47
restrictions justified by consumer protection and product liability con-
siderations,48 and restrictions which purchasers can circumvent by buy-
ing the product at a higher price.49
Finally, last year in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,50
the Supreme Court simply overruled Schwinn, concluding from "schol-
arly and judicial authority" that many vertical restrictions have
"economic utility" and that "the appropriate decision is to return to the
rule of reason that governed vertical restrictions prior to Schwinn." '51
This decision certainly clarified the state of the applicable law, but it
equally certainly complicated the task of litigating a vertical restriction
case. Under Continental T. V., Inc., vertical non-price restrictions can
no longer be found illegal without the "elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use ' 52 that is
required by a rule of reason analysis.53
The short of the matter is that while per se treatment is said to be the
judicial means of avoiding economic analyses that are beyond the
capabilities of the judicial mode of resolving disputes, 54 and while the
current furor over the big case seems to be pregnant with an admission
that courts are not capable of handling detailed economic analysis in
44. Id. at 379.
45. Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975); Kaiser v.
General Motors Corp., 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976).
46. Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 987 (1973).
47. Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d 398, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 938 (1968).
48. Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970).
49. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1379-80 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
50. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
51. Id. at 57-59.
52. Id. at 57 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
53. See note 42 supra.
54. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972).
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numerous antitrust cases, not one significant category of cases has been
added to the per se list since Schwinn, and the Schwinn category has now
been deleted. There has even been some suggestion that the logical
extension of the Continental T. V., Inc. case is application of the rule of
reason to the traditionally per se offense of resale price maintenance,
55
thus extending the categories of cases which inherently require de-
tailed-and hence prolonged and extensive-analysis.
Litigation under section 2 of the Sherman Act has met a similar fate.
Judicial efforts to simplify such litigation have been extremely rare and
have not reached the Supreme Court level at all. The Supreme Court has
not reviewed a major monopolization case since Grinnell Corp., and
even in Grinnell Corp. it dodged the proposal of the lower court that a
showing of monopoly power be deemed to create a rebuttable presump-
tion of illegal monopolization. 56 In the years since, the Court has re-
peatedly declined certiorari petitions for review of section 2 cases.17
Consequently, section 2 cases are still governed by broad generalizations
that require in-depth analysis and concomitantly broad discovery, and the
authoritative "lines of interpretation" of section 2 have still not hardened
sufficiently to avoid the kind of uncertainty that virtually forces litigants
to overprepare their cases.
The most notable attempts to draw sharp boundaries of legality in
section 2 litigation have come from the Ninth Circuit, which has dealt
with a number of cases under the attempt clause of section 2 in which an
initial simplifying formula has been followed by subsequent qualifica-
tions and reformulations, often without a redeeming quality of clarifica-
tion.
In Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. , decided in 1964, the Ninth Circuit
rejected "the premise that probability of actual monopolization is an
essential element of proof of attempt to monopolize" 5 9 and stated bluntly
55. Address by R. Posner, Federal Bar Association Conference, The Supreme Court
and Antitrust Revisionism (Nov. 2-3, 1977).
56. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 n.7 (1966).
57. See, e.g., Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 559
F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 782 (1978); Pacific Eng. & Prod. Co. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 234 (1977); Knutson v.
Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); FLM
Collision Parts, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 543 F.2d 1019 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1097 (1977); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1074 (1977); Yoder Bros. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977); United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296
(8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); Hallmark Indus. v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
58. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
59. Id. at 474.
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that " [w]hen the charge is attempt (or conspiracy) to monopolize, rather
than monopolization, the relevant market is 'not in issue.' ",60 This
holding was reaffirmed six years later in Industrial Building Materials,
Inc. v. Interchemical Corp. 61 Thus, it would seem that inquiry into the
difficult issues of relevant market and dangerous probability were ex-
cluded from the scope of discovery and trial.
But only one year later, in Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C. T.S.
Co. ,62 the circuit held that to establish an attempt to monopolize case, the
plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant had a specific
intent to monopolize and (2) that it had sufficient market power to come
dangerously close to success.6 3 The court also stated that Cornwell's
"threshold problem in proving a prima facie case for any of its antitrust
claims was proof of a well-defined relevant market upon which the
challenged anticompetitive actions would have had a substantial im-
pact.' ' Thus, the Ninth Circuit seemed to be refuting Lessig and
reinjecting into section 2 attempt cases the need to prove both relevant
market and dangerous probability, and hence the need for broad econom-
ic inquiry.
One year later, in Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co. ,65 the court
reformulated its position, again asserting, "[T]his Court has ruled that an
attempt to monopolize under section 2 does not require proof of monopo-
ly power. Proof that there is a 'dangerous probability of success' is
certainly enough. Evidence of market power is relevant but not indis-
pensable to a Lessig claim. "66 Of course, Lessig had fairly well implied
that proof of market power is not even relevant (i.e., "not in issue"),
and that proof of a dangerous probability of success is not necessary
either. Thus, Moore simultaneously remolded Lessig as a case which
contemplated alternative means of proving dangerous probability and
reinjected some vitality into Lessig. Exactly how much is still not clear.
Some months later, in Hallmark Industry v. Reynolds Metals Co. ,67
the Ninth Circuit asserted, citing Lessig, that specific intent is the only
evidence of dangerous probability of monopolization that is necessary to
a section 2 attempt claim, and that such intent may be inferred from
conduct undertaken without legitimate business purpose and directed at
60. Id. (citation omitted).
61. 437 F.2d 1336, 1344 (9th Cir. 1970).
62. 446 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
63. Id. at 832.
64. Id. at 829.
65. 473 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1972).
66. Id. at 332 (citation omitted).
67. 489 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
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setting prices or excluding competition. 68 Soon after, in Twin City
Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co. ,69 the court indicated that
a section 2 attempt claim may be established either by a showing of
sufficient market power in a traditionally defined relevant market or by
establishing a section 1 trade restraint that demonstrates specific intent to
monopolize. Of course, the second alternative does not eliminate the
need to show actual adverse effects on competition in a meaningful
economic market unless a per se violation is evident, in which case the
plaintiff might get relief under section 1 unaided by section 2.
In subsequent decisions, the concept of "a Lessig claim" has been
reshaped further, and it is still being formulated. 70 As a result of this
constant state of flux and the overall poor recovery record of Lessig
claims, even in the Ninth Circuit no prudent lawyer or district judge can
expect Lessig to have any semblance of vitality in the practical context of
limiting discovery or trial evidence in an attempt to monopolize case. 71
In a second series of cases, the Ninth Circuit has toyed with simplifica-
tion of the concept of predatory pricing in section 2 attempt cases. In
Hanson v. Shell Oil Co. ,72 the court stated that "proof of pricing below
marginal or average variable cost is prerequisite to a prima facie show-
ing of an attempt to monopolize." 73 Although the court added that "such
a showing, if made, would not show a per se violation. . . . [but
instead] . . . merely clears the first hurdle and raises the question of
justification," 74 the below cost criterion was a simplistic, clear formula
which could have cleared many section 2 attempt cases of a good deal of
discovery and trial time. But the next two attempt cases in the Ninth
Circuit75 which dealt with pricing did not even mention Hanson in
connection with the substantive offense, and in one the court invoked the
concept that where a large company establishes a price (not shown to be
below cost) designed to limit the competitive opportunities of others, that
68. Id. at 12.
69. 512 F.2d 1264, 1276 (9th Cir. 1975).
70. See, e.g., Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977);
Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 504-05
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 782 (1978); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d
795, 813-15 (9th Cir. -1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
71. Other circuits which have addressed the problem have generally rejected the Lessig
approach. See cases cited note 36 supra.
72. 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
73. Id. at 1359 n.6.
74. Id.
75. Greyhound Computer Corp. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 559 F.2d 488
(9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 782 (1978); Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d
795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977).
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action may raise the possibility of an attempt to monopolize violative of
section 2.76
In its most recent decision on predatory pricing under section 2, the
Ninth Circuit stated that it "has been less than clear in formulating a
succinct, definitive test to determine predatory pricing" and cited Han-
son as a case in which it gave "some general guidelines," ' 77 thereby
completing the circle and returning the law on pricing claims to its
normal status of uncertainty and vagueness.
In short, major developments in substantive antitrust law over the past
decade or so seem to indicate that other than the most time-honored per
se rules, simplistic, rigid formulas for separating the innocents from the
wrongdoers are not tenable in antitrust litigation where the particular
aggregation of facts in each new case seems to present unique nuances of
economic right or wrong. The apparent unwillingness of the Supreme
Court and other lower courts to "codify" substantive rules and the
apparent inability of the Ninth Circuit to adhere to any codification which
dispenses with the need for wide-ranging, individualized inquiry under-
score the point that, when all is said and done, the complexity of so many
antitrust cases is attributable to the substantive law on which they are
premised.
Ill. SOME MODEST PROPOSALS
The foregoing discussion is not intended as a criticism of the devel-
oping case law in antitrust, nor as an argument for any particular substan-
tive rule of law, nor even as an argument for simplistic rules in general. It
is rather intended to suggest that the line between energetic, legitimate
competition on the one hand and anticompetitive behavior on the other is
not always clear and cannot always be defined in advance or by simplistic
criteria of universal applicability. Consequently, there is a strong procliv-
ity in our system to evaluate antitrust claims on a case-by-case basis
which takes into account the unique economic facts of each case and
which necessarily results in expansive inquiry during discovery and trial.
The size and complexity that this ad hoc approach engenders in
antitrust litigation is more or less impervious to change by procedural
reform. As long as a plaintiff is required to demonstrate, or a defendant
to disprove, the anticompetitive impetus of a defendant's acts and the
specific anticompetitive consequences of those acts in the complex
economic environment of a relevant market, that party must be allowed
76. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 814 n.2 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
433 U.S. 910 (1977).
77. Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977).
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latitude in discovery and trial to do so. It is therefore unrealistic to expect
that many big cases can be effectively shrunk by procedural devices and
remain effective enforcement tools within the limits of the substantive
law as it exists today. 78 Moreover, given the infinite variety of predatory
schemes which can be devised and of circumstances which may coincide
to make a particular set of acts anticompetitive under those circum-
stances, albeit not under others, it appears that such an alternative is not
even desirable.
However, within the limits of the substantive law, there is room for
eliminating some of the time-consuming but wasteful litigation activity
that is currently a norm in big case litigation.
A. Proposals for Improved Management of Individual Cases
In light of the substantive source of size, the greatest prospect for
controlling the big antitrust case may not be formal rule revision at all,
but rather greater judicial involvement. The judge is in a position to
restrain the lawyer's natural proclivities toward ever broadening the
pleadings, issues, discovery and trial. Taking the needs of the individual
case into account, he can structure discovery to curb the use of time-
consuming, but largely useless, interrogatories, and of harassing margin-
al depositions and early in the game can force to a head those preliminary
issues and defenses which may limit or dispose of the case.
All these things can be done under the present rules. But they cannot
be done by perfunctory status conferences or by awaiting motions to
compel discovery. They require special efforts on the part of the judge.
In this regard, there are a number of possibilities for reform which are
worthy of consideration:
1. Roster of Judges
Development of a roster of judges in a position to oversee closely the
development of a complex antitrust case by virtue of experience and time
to become familiar with the facts of the case and to control the discovery
may help improve the management of such cases. The factor of time is
particularly important. Unless he has time to familiarize himself with the
pleadings filed and to question the attorneys as to the essence of their
contentions, no judge or human alive can be in a position to identify
78. Nor is it realistic to expect that antitrust cases can be reduced to smooth simplicity
by tinkering with the substantive law. It would take a drastic act of Congress, like the bill
proposed two years ago by Senator Bayh, S. 1284, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), to so
rework the law. Given the quick, strong adverse reaction to that proposal, it appears that a
totally new rigid or simplistic set of antitrust laws is not in the offing.
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factual issues, to force the lawyers to narrow issues, or to prevent the
studied ambiguities by which lawyers adroitly avoid doing so.
2. Use of Magistrate in Other Cases
Not all cases filed in federal courts call for the judicial expertise or
attention which complex antitrust litigation requires. Even if it is not
feasible to develop a special roster of judges for antitrust cases, those
judges which are handling antitrust matters might free themselves to
devote more time to complex antitrust cases by more liberal use of
magistrates, as provided in the Federal Magistrates Act,79 to handle
discovery and, with the consent of the parties, trial itself, in some of the
more routine types of cases. 80
3. Judicial Control of Discovery
Imposition of controls on discovery might be instituted either at the
outset of the case or promptly upon the first appearance of abuse, delay
or aimless meandering by the attorneys. For example, the "twenty-
interrogatory" rule used increasingly by individual judges8" to limit the
number of interrogatories which may be propounded without leave of
court may not be suitable for incorporation into the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, but selective application in appropriate cases may go far to
reduce the use of this discovery tool, which has become notoriously
burdensome and largely unproductive.
Greater use of such sanctions as the imposition of costs for harassing
discovery or delay, already provided for by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 82 can also assist in encouraging lawyers to take care in
framing and responding to discovery requests.
Similarly, greater use of requests for admissions and judicial scrutiny
to prevent weaseling answers can help to narrow issues and focus the area
of dispute.
4. Early Identification and Disposition of Controlling Legal Issues
In general, as the Supreme Court has noted, summary procedures
should be "used sparingly" in antitrust litigation, particularly where
79. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
80. Id. § 636 sets forth the jurisdiction and powers of the United States magistrates.
81. For example, Judge Turrentine in the Southern District of California; Judge Single-
ton in the Southern District of Texas in In re Corrugated Carton Antitrust Litigation,
Judge Burns in the District of Oregon; Judge Renfrew in the Northern District of Califor-
nia; and Judge Will in the Northern District of Illinois in In re Folding Carton Antitrust
Litigation.
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
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motive and intent, evidence of which lies primarily if not exclusively in
the hands of the defendants, are all-important."3 However, there are some
claims and defenses-e.g., statute of limitations, fraudulent concealment,
standing to sue, immunity, primary or exclusive agency jurisdiction,
collateral estoppel-which can be determined early in a suit either on the
basis of motion papers for partial summary judgment or with a limited
factual hearing with testimony in open court. Early resolution of such
issues helps to define the perimeter of the case and forces the parties to
limit all further inquiry to the central disputes outstanding between them.
5. Use of a Non-Trial Judge, Magistrate or Master Solely
for Purposes of Settlement Discussion
Discussion with a disinterested third party can be a very useful mecha-
nism for settling disputes. But lawyers may generally and understandably
feel inhibited about discussing in total candor a case, particularly its weak
points, with a judge assigned to that case for trial as well as pretrial. Use
of a magistrate or even another judge to guide settlement discussions can
obviate fears that admissions or characterizations made during the discus-
sion will return to haunt the parties at trial. This procedure was used with
success in In re Boise Cascade Securities Litigation, 4 a securities case
estimated to take several months in trial, which was settled after a
"settlement judge" from another district spent a week in discussions
with the parties.
6. Setting a Firm and Realistic Trial Date
Many cases amble along for years before the court or the parties even
begin to mention trial. Once a definite, realistic trial date is set, both
parties are under a real pressure to expedite discovery. But the date must
be firm and realistic in order to serve the purpose of encouraging both
sides to proceed with dispatch.
7. Adoption of Mechanical Procedures to Expedite Trial
There seems to be some feeling among antitrust lawyers and judges
that lay juries cannot understand the intricacies of an antitrust suit
sufficiently well to render reasoned verdicts. But the simple fact is that
almost nothing is done to help them understand the nature of their task. In
most cases, they are told in preliminary statements what facts each
lawyer expects to prove. Then a plethora of factual testimony and
83. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
84. 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (order striking demand for jury trial).
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contradictions is literally thrown at them, often through the boring
medium of depositions recited at length by lawyers. Only then, after all
the testimony is in, are they really told what this fuss is all about, what
the elements of the legal violation of, say, "monopolization" are, and
what it takes to establish those elements. The jury's task would be far
more reasonable if this time-honored but inefficient order of things were
changed to include:
(a) Agreed-upon statements of fact;
(b) Preliminary instructions informing the jury of the elements of
the legal violation charged at the outset of the case;
(c) Opening statements of broadened scope, allowing the law-
yers some leeway in informing the jury not only of the facts they
expect to prove but of their view of the legal significance of those
facts;
(d) Increased use of visual presentations, including charts, dia-
grams, and blowups of major documents;
(e) Curbs on cumulative testimony;
(f) Limitations on the number of experts testifying;
(g) Statements during trial by the court, counsel, or both, describ-
ing for the jury the areas that have been covered and the next
upcoming phase of proof.
None of these suggestions is particularly novel or particularly dramat-
ic. None will serve to convert the big antitrust case into simple, speedy or
small litigation. With such reforms, antitrust cases will still very often be
big, as the substantive law requires, but they may be less wasteful.
B. Some Proposals for Reducing Duplication Between Cases
The adoption of the Manual for Complex Litigation,85 with its proce-
dures for coordinating or consolidating similar private cases through
reference to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, has gone a long
way to reduce wasteful duplication between such cases. But there re-
mains one discrete group of cases which is susceptible to some signifi-
cant shrinkage by procedural reform, namely, the private suits which
follow in the wake of government actions. At the present time, there is an
enormous amount of duplication in discovery and trial of government and
private suits challenging the same conduct by the same defendants, and
often this duplication serves little purpose other than allowing the defend-
ant to impede or delay enforcement of the antitrust laws.
85. 1 Pt. 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1948).
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1. Collateral Estoppel
Nowhere is the wasteful and unnecessary duplication of effort more
apparent than in those private cases which follow successfully completed
government suits. Under section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 86 private
plaintiffs may use a final judgment or decree in government antitrust
proceedings as prima facie evidence as to all matters on which it would
operate as an estoppel between the government and the defendant. The
section has limited practical value in terms of reducing discovery and
trial time because, in practice, the private litigant must relitigate the
government's case in order to establish his own convincingly and to
respond to the defenses raised by his opponent. As one commentator has
said,
[s]ection 5, in and of itself, means little to a plaintiff unless he
fortifies its impact upon the minds of the jury with a dramatic
reproduction, de novo, of the same kind of evidence which resulted
in the Government's earlier victory. . . Section 5 substantially
decreases neither the length of treble damage suits, the extent of
preparation nor the cost.
8 7
In enacting section 5(a), Congress clearly intended to confer a special
benefit on private antitrust plaintiffs and thereby stimulate private anti-
trust enforcement. 88 But at the time it did so, the doctrine of mutuality,
which held that only one who was party or privy to a prior proceeding
and therefore bound by the final judgment in it could invoke that judg-
ment as collateral estoppel against another, was in full force throughout
the country and was even thought to have a constitutional due process
dimension. Thus, in 1914, when section 5(a) was passed, the limited
benefit of a prima facie rule was believed to be the outer limit of
congressional power to facilitate private antitrust litigation.
89
Time has proved this belief wrong. Over the years, the doctrine of
86. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (Supp. V 1975).
87. Note, Clayton Act, Section 5: Aid to Treble Damage Suitors?, 61 YALE L.J. 417,
425 n.33 (1952) (quoting communication, dated May 17, 1951, from Harold Stickler,
attorney for the plaintiff in Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558
(1951)). Similar statements by the attorney for the defendant in that case are also set out in
the same footnote. Even the Supreme Court has recognized that the practical value of the
prima facie rule of section 5(a) is often limited. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New
Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 319 (1965).
88. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 51 CONG. REC. 16,276 (1914).
89. As first proposed by the House, the bill would have given government decrees
conclusive effect in subsequent private actions. It was then honed into a prima facie rule
in the Senate. The Senate committee felt that although there were "considerations of
public policy which favor the House provision of conclusiveness," the House version
might not withstand judicial review; the House ultimately agreed. Id.
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mutuality has been discredited and application of the doctrine of collater-
al estoppel has expanded enormously. The principal considerations im-
pelling this change in the common law have been judicial economy and a
growing recognition that there is no basic unfairness in precluding a party
who has had one "full and fair opportunity to litigate" an issue from
relitigating it when the identity of his adversary changes. 90
Today, there is little doubt that under common law principles of
collateral estoppel, a private antitrust plaintiff generally could use a prior
judgment or decree in a government suit to preclude relitigation of the
issues actually and necessarily decided against the defendant. Indeed, in
at least one instance where one private antitrust suit followed another, it
was held that collateral estoppel was available in the second case. 91 But
in cases where the private suit follows a government suit, some courts
have held that section 5(a) defines the limit of the private plaintiff's right
to use the prior judgment, that it is prima facie evidence only.
92
As one commentator has stated,
[t]he irony is apparent-a statute which was designed to aid private
antitrust litigants now deprives this supposedly preferred class of
litigants of a right to which they would otherwise be entitled. This
result is not required by the text or legislative history of the Clayton
Act, the law of collateral estoppel or the right to jury trial.
93
In light of the extreme burdens imposed on both courts and parties by
litigation of the typically "big" antitrust case, the economy motive for
extension of collateral estoppel is particularly acute in the antitrust arena.
Nor is there any compelling consideration of fairness which requires that
antitrust defendants be permitted to duplicate litigation when others are
90. As the Supreme Court stated in its leading decision on collateral estoppel,
[t]he courts have often discarded the [mutuality] rule while commenting on crowded
dockets and long delays preceding trial. Authorities differ on whether the public
interest in efficient judicial administration is a sufficient ground in and of itself for
abandoning mutuality, but it is clear that more than crowded dockets is involved. The
broader question is whether it is any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one
full and fair opportunity for judicial resolution of the same issue.
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 328
(1971) (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has now effectively answered this broader
question in the negative. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
91. In re Gypsum Cases, No. 46414-A (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 1971); see also Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 758-62 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
92. Compare Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308 F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
aff'd, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065 (1971) with Illinois v.
Huckaba & Sons Constr. Co., [1978] 845 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) F-I (S.D.
Ill. Dec. 14, 1977).
93. Comment, The Use of Government Judgments in Private Antitrust Litigation: Clay-
ton Act Section 5(a), Collateral Estoppel, and Jury Trial, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 338, 374
(1976).
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not. Government cases which go to trial are serious business, and
defendants may reasonably be expected to argue and present all favorable
facts and contentions as vigorously as possible on that first round. A
growing body of authority suggests that the anachronistic limitation of
section 5(a) can be eliminated by judicial interpretation and that legisla-
tive intervention is not required.94 But one way or the other, given the
contemporary range of common law collateral estoppel, the wasteful
duplication engendered by a prima facie limitation should be eliminated.
2. Disclosure of Discovery Collected by the Government
Much duplication in discovery efforts could be avoided by adoption of
a policy, along with appropriate procedures to implement it, that infor-
mation accumulated by the government in its antitrust litigation be freely
available to private litigants, notwithstanding entry of a consent decree or
nolo contendere plea.
The great majority of criminal antitrust suits are terminated by a plea
of nolo contendere which deprives private litigants of even the limited
benefits of section 5(a) of the Clayton Act.95 If the government has
brought a companion civil suit, it is then usually terminated by a consent
decree which is also unusable as prima facie evidence of violation in
private suits. 96 As a result, the private litigants generally derive no
benefit from the outcome of government suits, even though a nolo plea is
deemed an implied admission of guilt at least for sentencing purposes,
even though the terms of sentencing or of a consent decree are highly
favorable to the government, and even though there is a statutory scheme
which is theoretically designed to aid and encourage private litigation.
The rationale for this seemingly anomalous result is that defendants are
to be encouraged to avoid lengthy and involved trials and are therefore
induced to plead nolo contendere or enter consent decrees. 97 Yet it is
doubtful whether avoiding the donnybrook in an initial government
action does anything more than transfer to other judges, who are presid-
ing over treble damage suits, the greater burden of even more lengthy and
94. See Illinois v. Huckaba & Sons Constr. Co., [1978] 845 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) F-1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 1977). The comment cited note 93 supra takes the
position that § 5(a) does not preclude application of collateral estoppel, as does McWil-
liams, Federal Antitrust Decrees: Should They Be Given Conclusive Effect in a Subsequent
Private Action ?, 48 Miss. L.J. 1 (1977). But see Purex Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 308
F. Supp. 584 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 453 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1065 (1972); Comment, Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act and Offensive Collateral Estoppel
in Antitrust Damage Actions, 85 YALE L.J. 541 (1976).
95. United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,436
(N.D. Ill. 1977); United States v. Saks & Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 160,219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
96. United States v. Saks & Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 1 60,219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
97. Id.; City of Burbank v. General Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 825 (9th Cir. 1964).
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involved trials preceded by lengthy and involved discovery which, on the
basic question of defendant's liability, largely duplicates the work al-
ready done by the government. Therefore, a strong argument can be
made that the public interest would be better served were section 5(a)
amended to give nolo pleas, at least, the same effect as guilty verdicts or,
in the absence of statutory revision, were judges to use their discretion in
allowing nolo pleas or approving consent decrees far more sparingly in
antitrust litigation than has been the case in the past.9"
At a minimum, however, the public interest would be well served by a
policy of disgorgement of evidentiary data-notes or transcripts of wit-
ness interviews and testimony as well as documents and factual anal-
yses--collected by the government in all cases, including those ter-
minated by a consent decree or nolo plea. Since both forms of disposition
are subject to prosecutorial advice and judicial approval, 99 there is no
clear reason why judges could not make such disclosure a condition of
acceptance of the disposition. While a good part of such material can be
obtained through separate civil discovery or under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act, 1" an express condition of disclosure would be helpful in
eliminating any need for wrangling over the private parties' right to all of
it. Such a policy of disgorgement would have a most significant impact
on those private suits which follow criminal indictments. At present, rule
16(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the principle that a
plaintiff must show "particularized need''101 in order to be entitled to
98. Several courts have indicated that the effect of a plea of nolo contendere on private
litigants should be taken into account in determining whether or not the court should
accept the plea, but in very few reported decisions has a nolo plea been rejected even in
part based on such considerations. Compare, e.g., United States v. Brighton Bldg. &
Maintenance Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,436 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (plea denied), United States
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 288 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1968) (plea
denied without prejudice to renewal motion), and United States v. Standard Ultramarine
& Color Co., 137 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (plea denied) with United States v. Saks &
Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. 60,219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (plea allowed), United States v. Burling-
ton Indus., Inc., 1965 Trade Cas. 71,376 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), United States v. R. & G.
Sloane Mfg. Co., 1973-I Trade Cas. 74,289 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (plea allowed), and United
States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 1957 Trade Cas. 68,713 (D. Colo. 1957) (plea allowed).
Other courts have expressly stated that a nolo contendere plea should not be refused in
order to aid private litigants. E.g., United States v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 1959 Trade Cas.
69,435 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 451 (N.D.
Tex. 1957).
99. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. Cf. United States v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co., 1960
Trade Cas. 69,835 (D. Mass. 1960) (consent decree specifically provided that it would
constitute prima facie evidence in certain suits by state and local governments).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Act of Sept. 13, 1976, 90
Stat. 1241.
101. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
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peruse grand jury materials impede disgorgement of facts underlying an
indictment and sometimes effectively render years' worth of work by
government attorneys wholly useless.
Several courts have implicitly recognized that the justification for
maintaining the secrecy of grand jury testimony drops off precipitously
after indictment and even more so after final disposition of the criminal
suit."2 One recent decision has noted that of the numerous justifications
for grand jury secrecy, only one operates to any meaningful degree after
the defendant has been sentenced: "The reason that survives the grand
jury's term and the criminal proceeding is the need to protect the grand
jury witnesses from retaliation, lest witnesses before future grand juries
be inhibited by the knowledge 'that the secrecy of their testimony [may]
be lifted tomorrow.' "103
The court went on to note that this reason is "considerably diminish-
ed" when the witness's corporate employer has had access to his tes-
timony and is reduced to a virtual nullity when the employer has dis-
closed the testimony to co-defendant industry members.t°4 As a practical
matter, in many, if not all, cases, corporate defendants and other industry
members probably know who "talked" whether or not they actually
obtain and read grand jury transcripts. 10 5
The question which then arises is whether this reason is sufficiently
strong to justify imposing on the system the burden of reaccumulating the
testimony already gathered. The ever-increasing concern over the strain
which massive discovery places on the system and the apparent trend
toward weakening the "particularized need" requirement suggest that
the judiciary is coming to recognize that it is not.
IV. CONCLUSION
The "big case" has become a permanent fixture in antitrust litigation.
It arises in large measure from the complex subject matter with which
antitrust law deals and from a legal system of evaluating antitrust claims
which values flexibility more than simplicity in dealing with the almost
infinite variety of devices which may be perceived as stifling free and
102. See Petrol Stops Northwest v. Douglas Oil Co., 571 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1978);
Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 1977-1 Trade Cas. T 61,370 (7th Cir. 1977); United States Indus.,
Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 345 F.2d 18, 21-22 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965).
103. Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,370 (7th Cir. 1977) at 71,312 (quoting
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)).
104. Illinois v. Sarbaugh, 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,370 (7th Cir. 1977) at 71,312. But see
Texas v. United States Steel Corp., 1977-1 Trade Cas. 1 61,267 (5th Cir. 1977).
105. It is regular and prudent practice to "debrief" each employee witness after he or
she has testified.
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open competition. Such a system inherently tends toward expansive and
expensive litigation, for the detailed exploration of facts is crucial and
precedents are of limited value. The big case can be streamlined and
duplicative discovery work can be reduced significantly. But as long as a
commitment to vigorous antitrust enforcement persists side by side with a
desire to avoid the straightjacketing effects of rigid, substantive formulas
(and this latter seems to be increasing), there can be no procedural
panacea to shrink big antitrust cases to proportions comparable to
garden variety negligence suits.

